Assessing the impact of risk allocation on Sustainable Energy Innovation (SEI): The case of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) school projects by Badi, SM & Pryke, S
1 
Assessing the impact of risk allocation on Sustainable 
Energy Innovation (SEI): The case of Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) school projects 
 
Sulafa M. Badi* and Stephen D. Pryke 
 
The Bartlett, School of Construction and Project Management 
University College London (UCL) 
1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 6BT 
Sulafa Badi: T: +44 (0) 207 679 5685, E: s.badi@ucl.ac.uk 
Stephen Pryke: T: +44 (0) 207 679 5904, E: s.pryke@ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
*Corresponding author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UCL Discovery Copy 
Paper to be published in International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, DOI: 10.1108/IJMPB-10-2015-0103 
 
 
  
2 
Assessing the impact of risk allocation on Sustainable 
Energy Innovation (SEI): The case of Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) school projects 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is inevitable that innovative endeavours will entail a certain amount of risk. Indeed, innovation and 
risk often go hand-in-hand in construction projects (Raisbeck, 2008; Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 
2008ab). Risk is defined in the current version of the risk management standard - ISO 31000:2009 as 
‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’ with uncertainty arising whenever the ‘understanding or 
knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood’ is inadequate or incomplete (ISO, 2009). Risk 
includes both opportunities and threats and therefore can create both positive and negative deviations 
from the expected (Hillson, 2000). To Berglund and Hellström (2002) ‘risk is a factor in all innovative 
processes in so far as purposeful, goal-directed action is always directed towards an uncertain future 
with some possible reward’ (Berglund and Hellström, 2002, p. 207). The strategies to identify, 
allocate and manage those risks depend to a great extent on the type of project, the procurement route 
adopted, and the contractual arrangements between project participants (Osipova and Eriksson, 
2011).  
 
The allocation of risk between the contracting parties is often seen as important factor in the creation 
of innovation success in complex projects (Brady and Davies, 2010; Gil et al. 2012; Hobday, 1998; 
Miller and Lessard, 2000). This is particularly in relation to the great up-front investments required 
and the high level of uncertainty, and therefore risk, associated with the success of innovation. The 
management of risk is particularly important for sustainable technologies, as the risks associated with 
their development and implementation are often seen as major barriers to their successful adoption 
(Christie et al., 2011; Häkkinen and Belloni, 2011). 
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This study sought to examine the capacity of risk allocation to encourage the implementation of 
Sustainable Energy Innovation (SEI). SEI is a subset of environmental innovation which has been 
broadly defined as “novel technological products or solutions that are successfully integrated into 
buildings’ design strategies in order to prevent or substantially reduce the negative impacts of energy 
use by increasing energy efficiency, or utilising new ways of renewable energy generation” (Badi 
and Pryke, 2015, p. 412). This study concentrates on risk allocation within Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) project delivery model. The attention given to PFI in this study is driven by the increasing call 
for greater understanding of contractual drivers of innovation in complex public sector procurement 
models (Caldwell and Roehrich, 2008; Edelenbos and Teisman, 2008; Roumboutsos and Saussier, 
2014).  
 
The study followed a research design based on four qualitative case studies of new-build PFI schools. 
Our research design emphasises one key unit of analysis: how risk allocation within the PFI contract 
(as it was adopted within Building Schools for the Future (BSF), a UK school renewal programme) 
was perceived by private sector actors to influence the energy strategy during the design development 
stage and how this may have shaped the sustainable energy innovation implemented. Our key 
contribution is a conceptual understanding of the conditions under which risk allocation can support 
sustainable energy innovation. Our findings may also lead to a greater awareness of how complex 
procurement strategies, in the form of PFI, should work to support more innovative activity in the 
construction industry and to the growth or even creation of markets for innovative sustainable 
products and services (Erdmenger, 2003). 
 
The paper begins by introducing sustainable energy innovation and explain its importance in 
addressing the formidable challenges associated with climate change. We then we discuss the concept 
of risk and how it relates to innovation. We then introduce the study’s proposition suggesting that 
SEI is supported by clear, appropriate and manageable allocation of the risks associated with the 
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project’s energy performance. In the following sections, we describe the methodology and report 
results from four PFI case studies. In the final section of the paper we discuss the findings and outline 
the managerial and policy implications.  
2. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Sustainable Energy Innovation (SEI) 
The study of innovation dates as far back as 1911, and Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal work, ‘Theory 
of Economic Development’. Schumpeter (1980) described innovation as a historic and irreversible 
change in the way of doing things. The essence of Schumpeter’s definition of innovation is that it is 
an effort made by an entity that results in an economic gain, either by reducing cost or increasing 
income. Freeman and Soete (1997) defines innovation as “the actual use of a nontrivial change in a 
process, product or system that is novel to the institution developing the change” (Freeman and Soete, 
1997, p. 11). Freeman and Soete’s (1997) definition indicates that, to be considered an innovation, 
the change should be nontrivial, novel, and regarded as a significant improvement to existing products 
or practices. Innovations are ‘incremental’ to the extent that they reinforce existing products or 
processes, and are often based on current knowledge and experience (Slaughter, 1998; Taylor and 
Levitt, 2004) whilst ‘radical’ innovations are those producing disruptive changes in a specific field 
and result from entirely new approaches to understanding and problem-solving (Slaughter, 1998).  
 
Sustainable energy innovation is a particular subset of environmental innovation, which has been 
broadly defined by Dewick and Miozzo (2002) as the use of production equipment, techniques, 
procedures, products, and product delivery mechanisms that are sustainable; that is, they conserve 
resources and energy, minimise environmental impact, and protect the natural environment. Mostly, 
innovation which has the effect of promoting sustainable energy involves two main strategies: energy 
efficiency and renewable energy.  Energy Efficiency is essentially the reduction of energy inputs for 
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a given level of service, or enhancing the services for a given amount of energy inputs (National 
Science Foundation, 2009). Increased energy efficiency can lead to decrease in energy costs (for 
suppliers and consumers), as well as reduction in CO₂ emission levels (National Science Foundation, 
2009). Renewable Energy, on the other hand, is defined as ‘a flow of energy that is not exhausted by 
being used’ (Sørensen, 1991:386). Hence, renewable energy technologies are means by which such 
flows are converted into applicable devices (Sjöö, 2008). Renewable energy resources include the 
sun, wind, water currents, the heat of the Earth, and replaceable fuels such as from plants. As well as 
reducing stratospheric ozone depletion, acid precipitation, and the greenhouse effect, renewable 
energy resources are considered one of the most efficient and effective solutions (Dincer and Rosen, 
2012). Taking the definitions of energy efficiency and renewable energy into consideration, the term 
SEI is used on this research to represent novel technological products or solutions that are 
successfully integrated into building’s design strategies in order to prevent or substantially reduce the 
negative impacts of energy use by increasing energy efficiency, or utilizing new ways of renewable 
energy generation (Badi and Pryke, 2015).  
 
The focus on SEI in this study is driven by the growing calls around the Globe for sustainable energy 
and CO₂ emissions reduction (Brundtland, 1987; DEFRA, 2007). Meeting the formidable challenges 
associated with climate change will demand substantial technical progress to deliver more sustainable 
energy solutions for societal needs. Among the major strategies advocated by UK government reports 
to meet these pressing challenges for sustainable energy and CO₂ emission reduction is technological 
innovation (DTI, 2007; Stern, 2006; Thalmann, 2007). Stern (2006) emphasised the point that  
policies to encourage innovation and the implementation of low-carbon technologies are central to 
mitigating climate change. Whilst the call for SEI is evident in the preceding government reports, 
such innovations are, however, still in their embryonic stages (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Kelly, 2008). 
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2.4.  The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project delivery model is a specific type of Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) (HM Treasury, 2003), where a consortium of private sector firms, known as the 
Project Company (ProjectCo hereafter), assumes responsibility for designing, constructing, 
financing, and operating an infrastructure facility. The ProjectCo is contracted to provide the public 
services on a long-term concession period (typically, up to 30 years) with the relevant government 
body (HM Treasury, 2003). It has been argued that the introduction of PFI into governments’ 
procurement strategies has many benefits. These include control of public sector expenditure to curb 
inflation, overcoming the scarcity of public funds, and control over the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement - PFI contracts can be treated as ‘off balance sheet’ (Al‐bizri and Gray, 2010; Carbonara 
et al., 2014; McCabe et al., 2001). 
 
A major characteristic of PPP/PFI projects is the transfer of risk from the public sector to the private 
sector. Traditionally, construction projects entail the purchase of a product, largely governed by legal 
contracts, and based on fixed specifications and profit levels. The client assumes most of the risks, 
though risks related to the project end dates and construction methods are passed down the supply 
chain (Morris, 2013). A major consideration for the government in introducing PFI was the transfer 
of risk from the public sector to the private sector in order to introduce more discipline in risk analysis 
and allocation into public sector procurement (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Iossa and Martimort, 2012; 
Regan et al., 2011). Therefore, appropriate risk transfer is a fundamental requirement for VfM to be 
achieved in PFI project delivery models. While the contractual liability for a contractor under a 
traditional procurement contract is limited to a shorter period, usually 12 months, under PFI the 
contractor is often liable for the delivery of the assets and a wide range of other services for the 
duration of the service period spanning 25–35 years (Gruneberg et al., 2007; Robinson and Scott, 
2008). 
7 
2.3 The Management of Risk in Project Environments 
Construction project environments are mainly characterised by two types of risk: project-related risk 
and innovation-related risk (Leiringer, 2006). Project-related risk encompasses a wide range of 
categories all concerned with the possible events that could endanger the planned course or objectives 
of the project (HM Treasury, 1997; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Rintala, 2004). Innovation-related risk 
is that faced by the innovating organisation in relation to the extent to which the innovation satisfies 
various technical criteria without compromising cost or schedule (Keizer and Halman, 2009). This 
includes a number of unavoidable risks such as technical risk (Unger and Eppinger, 2011), financial 
risk (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2014) and capital cost risk (Intrachooto and Horayangkura, 2007). 
Project- and innovation-related risks are interconnected and largely affect the outcome of the attempt 
to innovate (Leiringer, 2006). 
 
Risk management is widely considered as one of the most important procedures in the field of project 
management, principally concerned with realising opportunities and avoiding threats (Royer, 2002; 
Turner, 2009). Risk management involves four fundamental processes: risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk allocation and risk mitigation. To be managed appropriately, risk has to be clearly 
identified (Akintoye et al., 2001). Following the identification of risk, its significance to project 
outcome needs to be adequately assessed. The risk assessment process may include reviewing, 
understanding and determining the importance of all the risks that can impact on the project and 
estimating the likelihood of their occurrence (Chapman and Ward, 2003). The risk impact is often 
estimated in terms of financial cost or completion time (Loosemore et al., 2006; Akintoye et al., 
2001). Risk allocation is the third step in the risk management process. Ideally, risk should be 
assigned to the party that has the greater ability to influence the probability of occurrence or the 
degree of consequence of the risk and has the best access to suitable mitigation techniques for the risk 
(Loosemore et al., 2006). However, as Chapman and Ward (2003) noted, this is by no means an easy 
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exercise. In some cases the position of risk in not evident, as risks sometimes cross organisational 
boundaries and cannot be allocated to a single party. Following the allocation of risk, risk mitigation 
is concerned with the action taken by an actor to reduce the likelihood of a risk occurring as well as 
limiting the size of the consequence should the risk occur. There are several risk mitigation strategies 
such as risk avoidance/ elimination, risk reduction, risk transfer, and risk retention/ absorption 
(Chapman and Ward, 2003). Souitaris (2001) argues that managers of innovative firms are more 
favourably inclined towards risk acceptance.  
2.4 Towards a Proposition: Contractual Risk Allocation, Incentives, and Innovation 
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the determinants of innovation 
in both main stream management studies and the specific field of construction research. A wide range 
of drivers has been identified, such as client requirement and involvement (e.g. Mitropoulos and 
Tatum, 2000; Ling et al., 2007; Pellicer et al., 2014), communication and collaboration (e.g. Nam 
and Tatum, 1989), contractual incentives (e.g. Bossink, 2004; Intrachooto and Horayangkura, 2007), 
and risk allocation (e.g. Leiringer, 2006) which underline the importance of interdependency and 
interaction between the different organisations involved within complex projects. Of these issues, 
only contractual risk allocation is relevant to this research and is reviewed further below. 
 
Contracts are in effect a governance mechanism designed to achieve two main goals: to outline the 
structure of authority-responsibility, and share risk and reward among project partners (Giannoccaro 
and Pontrandolfo, 2004; Sen and Mitra, 2000). Contracts are safeguarding instruments against 
opportunistic behaviour, as they establish clear limits for breach of contractual specifications between 
clients and producers (Liker and Choi, 2004). In complex projects, contracts governing the 
relationships between producers and their upstream clients can range from traditional arms-length 
contracts to close cooperative relationships. Mostly, contractual incentives have their theoretical 
origin defined in the Principal-Agent Theory (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). The 
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Principal-Agent Theory mainly addresses the relationship between two contracting actors—the 
Principal and the Agent. The theory is primarily concerned with the difficulties that arise under 
conditions of imperfect and asymmetric information when a Principal appoints an Agent to pursue 
the Principal’s interests. The theory’s central assumption is that both actors will pursue their own 
objectives. Thus, it assumes that the Agent will adopt a strategy with which he will receive the 
maximum reward for the minimum effort (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Douma and Schreuder, 2008). 
Therefore, incentive-based contracts are designed to align the Agent’s objectives with those of the 
Principal.  
 
Several studies, adopting a system-oriented approach to innovation, have emphasised the importance 
of risk allocation among the contracting parties in determining innovation success (Hobday, 1998; 
Miller and Lessard, 2000). This is particularly in relation to the substantial investment required and 
the high level of uncertainty, and therefore risk, associated with the success of innovation. Thus, 
Hobday (1998) maintains that contractual incentives are needed for sharing project risks among 
clients and their producers. Construction-related studies of innovation equally underlined the 
importance of risk allocation in decision making associated with innovation (Akintoye et al., 2001; 
Loosemore et al., 2006; OECD, 2005). In their study of technology adoption decisions in mega 
infrastructure projects, Gil et al. (2012) identify that technological decisions are greatly affected by 
the project stakeholders’ attitude towards risk. Miozzo and Dewick (2002), explored the innovation 
drivers amongst the largest contractors in Europe, and concluded that innovative activities are often 
promoted by parties with both the incentive and the ability to allocate resources to investments with 
uncertain and irreversible outcomes.  
 
Three characteristics of risk allocation are considered important for innovation: clarity, 
appropriateness and manageability. In his study of technological innovations in PPPs, Leiringer 
(2006) maintains that greater clarity over the assumed risks, due to more explicit risk transfer under 
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a PPP, might benefit innovative activities as it allows the innovating organisation to make rational 
decisions. Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008b) also argue that the financial and legal uncertainty 
faced by the ProjectCo may be reduced by clear allocation of risk. In addition, government guidelines 
often use the maxim that risk should be allocated to the party best placed to control and manage it 
(UNIDO, 1996; HM Treasury, 2003). Ideally, risk should be assigned to the party that has the greater 
ability to influence the probability of occurrence or the degree of consequence of the risk and has the 
best access to suitable mitigation techniques for the risk (Loosemore et al., 2006). However, Thomas 
et al. (2003), in their survey of risk allocation strategies in BOT road projects in India, have found 
that this principle is rarely observed due to the differences in the perception of risk among the project 
participants. Ng and Loosemore (2007) also underlined the problems associated with inappropriate 
risk allocation on PPP projects, such as cost and time overruns and failure to deliver value-for-money 
objectives. They concluded that the risks allocated should not only be considered clear, but also 
appropriate and manageable.  
 
Following the arguments above, it can be proposed that: 
 
Clear, appropriate, and manageable allocation of the risks associated with the project’s energy 
performance can support innovative effort in the PFI project delivery model.  
 
The energy performance of buildings is associated with several types of risk such as regulatory, 
energy consumption and planning approval risks. For the ProjectCo to be innovative, the assumed 
risks associated with the project’s energy performance should be considered clear, appropriate and 
manageable. Greater clarity over the assumed risks will allow the innovating organisation to make 
rational decisions, which may benefit innovative activities. Greater appropriateness and 
manageability will support the equitable allocation of risk among project participants, thus 
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encouraging innovative efforts. In the next section, we describe the methodology adopted to examine 
the three issues within the context of the UK government Building Schools for the Future’ (BSF).  
3.  METHODS 
3.1 Context of the Study 
The study focused on schools delivered within the context of the UK government’s Building Schools 
for the Future (BSF) programme. BSF was an immensely ambitious programme designed to rebuild 
or refurbish all secondary schools in England over 15 years at a cost of £45 billion. As well as being 
a project to improve radically the fabric of school buildings and transform the educational experiences 
of pupils, it has been actively seeking to embed sustainability (House of Commons, 2007). The need 
for SEI in BSF schools was reinforced by the fact that school buildings are responsible for about 2% 
of greenhouse gases emissions in the UK, the equivalent to 15% of the national public sector 
emissions (DCSF, 2010). In order to address this challenge, the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families (DCSF) announced in 2007 that £110 million would be allocated for sustainable school 
buildings and set the ambitious target that all new-build schools should be ‘zero-carbon’ by 2016 
(DCSF, 2007i). The target was subsequently delayed to 2019 to match the EU Energy Performance 
of Buildings Directive. PFI was the government’s preferred project delivery model for 132 new-build 
BSF schools.  
3.2 The Case Studies 
A qualitative approach was considered the best-suited for this research, given the exploratory nature 
of the study (Yin, 2014). Four new-build BSF PFI school projects were selected for investigation 
following set criteria to ensure comparability and to maximise what could be learned from the study. 
Three case studies were selected on the grounds that they showed at least one significant SEI (Case 
Studies 1, 3 and 4), and one case study was selected on the grounds that it showed no evidence of SEI 
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(Case Study 2). This was pursued to facilitate a heterogeneous sample; the technique also termed 
‘maximum variation sampling’ in qualitative enquiry (Patton, 2005). This enabled the researcher to 
capture of a wide range of perspectives relating to the conditions under which SEI is implemented, 
or otherwise, and helped in highlighting common themes that held consistent across the case study 
projects. Literal replication was sought on the three innovative projects, while theoretical replication 
was tested on the project where no innovation was implemented (Yin, 2014). Literal replication in a 
case study, tests precisely the same outcomes, principles, or predictions established by the initial case 
study. Thus, it must be selected so that it predicts similar results. In contrast, a theoretical replication, 
is a case study that produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons. Under the development 
of a conceptual framework, literal replication can explain the conditions under which a particular 
phenomenon is likely to be found, whereas a theoretical replication can explain the conditions when 
it is not likely to be found (Yin, 2014) 
 
Identifying projects with evidence of implementing sustainable energy innovation was challenging. 
Extensive review of the national press and trade journals was undertaken to verify the nature of the 
solutions implemented and whether or not they could be considered innovative. In addition, so as to 
confirm the findings arising from the interview data, the case study projects and their innovative 
solutions were described to an independent heating and ventilation (HV) design expert. This 
confirmed that the sustainable energy innovations implemented could be considered a novel change 
from standard practice. Table 1 lists the pseudonym used to represent each of the case study projects 
and provides a brief outline of the location, value and the main sustainable energy innovations 
implemented. 
 
******INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ****** 
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Furthermore, to control as much as possible for the impact of contextual factors on innovation 
outcomes, the four case studies were early BSF schemes. This was to ensure that the projects were 
subjected to the same policy and economic environment, and followed the same BSF documentation 
and national legislation. This was the case with the first three case studies (Case Studies 1, 2 and 3), 
which were expected to offer insight into how the BSF PFI project delivery model, as it was during 
this initial period, influenced the pursuit of innovation for sustainable energy. Case Study 4 further 
benefited from the introduction of the government’s Carbon Funding and was awarded the extra 
funding of £50/m2 to meet the operational carbon target of 27Kg CO2/m2/yr. This case study may 
presented a special regulatory context and was included to maximise what could be learned from the 
research study.  
3.3 Data Collection 
Data collection for this research study was largely based on primary data, thus data gathered and 
assembled specifically for the research project at hand (Yin, 2014). The unit of analysis in this 
research study is the BSF PFI project and the key project actors involved served as the primary 
sources of data. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with ProjectCo representatives 
from each case study. Interviewees included the ProjectCo’s Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) bid 
managers, architects, M&E engineers, building contractors and facility managers. In total, 26 
interviews were conducted. Table 2 outlines the interview participants from each case study.  
 
******INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ****** 
 
A Case Study Interview Protocol was developed to guide the interview process. Interviewees were 
asked about their perception of the clarity, appropriateness and manageability of risk allocation 
associated with the project’s energy performance. The developed qualitative definitions of the 
conceptual constructs are outlined in Table 3.  
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******INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ****** 
 
Particularly, the following items were examined:  
 
1. Clarity of risk allocation: Participant’s perception of the extent to which the allocation of 
the risks associated with the energy strategy is free from confusion, uncertainty, ambiguity, 
or doubt. 
2. Appropriateness of risk allocation: Participant’s perception of the extent to which the 
allocation of the risks associated with the energy strategy is fitting for a particular entity or 
situation. 
3. Manageability of risk allocation: Participant’s perception of the extent to which the 
allocation of the risks associated with the energy strategy can be managed or controlled. 
 
All interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Data collection took place between April 2009 
and May 2010. Three of the case study projects, i.e. Case Studies 2, 3 and 4, were on-site when 
the researcher established first contact with the projects. Case Study 1 had been operational for a 
few months. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the transcribed interviews started by building chronological stories for each case 
study, triangulating the interpretations from the multiple ProjectCo respondents. Within-case analysis 
was then conducted using tabular displays to cluster and process the interview data. The within-case 
analysis helped to develop preliminary understanding of the main issues affecting risk allocation and 
innovation across the interdependent actors. Cross-case comparative analysis was then conducted 
using tabular displays as shown in Table 4 which helped identify the main issues that would hold 
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consistently across the units of analysis. In addition, cross-case analysis follows the advice of Yin 
(2014) in adopting an analytical strategy based on literal and theoretical replication. In this research 
study we aimed for literal replication between three innovative cases (Case Studies 1, 3 and 4) and 
theoretical replication in the case where no innovation was implemented (Case Study 2). 
 
******INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ****** 
4.  FINDINGS 
The findings indicate that the energy strategies developed on the four case study projects were 
influenced by the allocation of two types of risk to ProjectCo actors: project-related risk, and 
innovation-related risk. Project risks, as they relate to the energy strategy, are those assumed by 
ProjectCo actors in relation to the project meeting agreed environmental and energy performance 
standards. Innovation-related risks are those assumed by the innovating organisation in relation to the 
extent to which the innovation satisfies various technical criteria without compromising the project’s 
budget and schedule. The interplay between those two types of risk shaped the energy strategies and 
the innovations implemented on the case study projects. Figure 1 outlines the main identified risks 
associated with the energy strategy, while Table 5 provides brief definitions of the main risks involved 
and the parties to whom the risks are allocated under the BSF PFI contract. The findings are presented 
under three headings: (1) clarity of risk allocation; (2) appropriateness of risk allocation; and (3) 
manageability of risk allocation. 
******INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ****** 
******INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ****** 
4.1. Clarity of Risk Allocation 
In the literature, greater clarity of risk allocation is seen to reduce the financial and legal uncertainty 
faced by the innovating organisation and support rational decision making, which may benefit 
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innovation (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008b; Leiringer, 2006). ProjectCo actors on the innovative 
projects agreed that the risks associated with the project’s energy performance were generally made 
clear early in BSF documentation. This potentially benefitted innovation efforts. However, the 
situation was different on SVC (Case Study 2), the project where no innovation was implemented. 
The building contractor lacked adequate understanding of the BREEAM ‘Excellent’ requirementii 
and its implications on the project’s costs and time constraints. Indeed, post financial close, as there 
were penalties associated with meeting the requirement, the amount of time and resources needed to 
achieve it was a considerable challenge to the building contractor. This lack of understanding was 
explained by the newness of the requirement itself to the building contractor. As the project was the 
first BSF project to the building contractor, the environmental requirements associated with it, 
including BREEAM, were clearly underestimated. The requirement was eventually met but at a 
considerable cost, in terms of time and resources. The newness of some environmental requirements 
to firms, such as BREEAM, demands sufficient assessment of their impact on the planned course and 
objectives of the project. Without such assessment, it is likely that adequate understanding of what is 
needed to deliver the requirements, and manage the associated risks, will be weak.  
4.2. Appropriateness of Risk Allocation 
Most government guidelines advocate that risk should be allocated to the party best placed to control 
and manage it (HM Treasury, 2003; UNIDO, 1996). Blayse and Manley (2004) and Leiringer (2006) 
also stress the need for equitable allocation of risk among project participants. ProjectCo actors across 
the four case studies perceived the risks associated with the project’s energy performance to be mostly 
appropriately allocated. However, concerns were raised with regards to the building contractor 
assuming the initial energy consumption risk. This was explained by the difficulty to accurately 
predict energy consumption targets during the design process; the long period of time buildings need 
to settle into their natural level of performance; and the significant influence of end-user behaviour 
on energy consumption as opposed to the actual building itself. In addition, the government’s carbon 
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target of 27kg CO₂/m2/yr was seen to be onerous and difficult to completely close down. The success 
of any mitigation strategy was seen to be difficult to predict and can only be clear after the building 
is operational for a period of time. This perceived inappropriateness of risk allocation is potentially 
damaging as the OECD (2005) considers excessive perceived risk as one of the main barriers to 
innovation. 
 
Furthermore, an important issue that was highlighted by ProjectCo actors across the four case studies 
was the conflicting environmental requirements that needed to be met under the BSF PFI contract. 
The ProjectCo was required to balance the ‘Availability Clause’ which requires teaching spaces not 
to exceed 28°C for more than 120 hr/yr during core summer hours, whilst meeting agreed standards 
for maximum annual energy consumption in the PFI contract. The strategies adopted to achieve these 
conflicting requirements were mainly to reduce the demand for the energy required to cool those 
spaces through passive design principles, whilst maintaining the efficiency of the supply as much as 
possible. However, ProjectCo actors across the four case studies argued that the Availability Clause 
and temperature tolerances forming part of its criteria were potentially harmful to the energy 
efficiency and CO₂ reduction objectives. Excessive perceived availability risk may force contractors 
to install carbon-intensive technologies, such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems 
(HVAC), to ensure teaching spaces do not exceed 28°C and safeguard their long-term investment in 
the project. This is particularly detrimental in situations where penalties for non-availability 
considerably exceed penalties for not meeting annual energy consumption targets. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the temperature tolerances forming part of the Availability Clause may represent a 
considerable challenge to achieving the government’s target of zero-carbon schools by 2019 through 
PFI contracts. 
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4.3. Manageability of Risk Allocation 
The manageability of the risks allocated to ProjectCo actors was an important criterion across the 
case study projects. Importantly, the allocation of several types of risk to ProjectCo actors was found 
to have encouraged the pursuit of sustainable energy innovation as the innovations implemented were 
largely developed as strategies to manage several types of risk allocated to ProjectCo actors. This 
will be discussed below:  
 
 Perceived availability risk was a major consideration across the three innovative projects. Not 
meeting the availability criteria exposes the ProjectCo to payment deductions as part of 
performance monitoring linked to the Payment Mechanism. Availability risk was particularly 
a major consideration on BEC (Case Study 1), where the risks associated with the availability 
criteria were identified, evaluated, and the related financial penalties were deemed significant 
enough to influence the design process. The risk-averse attitude of the ProjectCo and its desire 
to protect its investment in the long-term resulted in setting challenging environmental targets 
for the design team to meet. In order to reach an extremely robust and safe design, teaching 
spaces were designed so as not to exceed 28°C for more than 20 hr/per year rather than the 
allowed 120 hr/yr under the BSF PFI contract. This was a highly ambitious target at the time 
and was pushing the boundaries of what could be achieved for sustainability. The design team 
needed to meet the target, whilst maintaining agreed standards for maximum annual energy 
consumption in the PFI contract. The target led to the development of the innovative 
ventilation chimney which ensured excellent air flow across the classrooms, minimising the 
need for mechanical ventilation and significantly reducing energy consumption during 
operation.  
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 Perceived energy consumption risk was a major consideration across the three innovative 
projects. Not meeting energy consumption targets exposes the ProjectCo to payment 
deductions as part of performance monitoring linked to the Payment Mechanism. On HGS 
(Case Study 3), energy consumption risk was particularly a major consideration. The design 
team was presented with challenging site constraints, mainly the adjacency of the site to a 
busy emergency route, which meant that 70% of the building needed to be mechanically 
ventilated. The team evaluated several energy strategies in order to increase the likelihood of 
meeting the energy consumption targets, while providing an internal environment comfortable 
to the school. The strategy adopted was to minimise the demand for energy, by increasing the 
building’s thermal mass and improving air leakage rates and U-values, as well as maintaining 
the efficiency of the supply as much as possible. The innovative energy supply strategy was 
a new combination of best available sustainable technologies in the market (mini-Combined 
Heat and Power Plant, Ground Source Heat Pump, Earth Tubes, and mini-Wind Turbine) to 
spread the risk across several technologies, energy providers, and users within the school.  
 
 Perceived operational carbon target risk encouraged the pursuit of innovation on BWS (Case 
Study 4). BWS was among the first BSF schools to bid for and be successfully awarded the 
DCSF additional funding of £50/m² to achieve the challenging target of 60% reduction in 
carbon emission (compared to a school being constructed to the energy efficiency standards 
set out in the 2002 Part L Building Regulation). The target was translated into an operational 
carbon target of no more than 27kg CO₂/m²/yr emission during core hours, which is a 
contractually binding operational obligation placed on the building contractor and linked to 
the payment mechanism. The innovative biodiesel Combined Heat and Power (CHP) solution 
was implemented to ensure that the building meets this operational target, significantly 
reducing the school’s dependence on electricity from the national grid.  
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Two key observations could be made from the above findings. First, the allocation of long-term 
energy performance risks to ProjectCo actors was successful in encouraging sustainable energy 
innovation. On PFI projects, the two specific mechanisms the Local Authority used to achieve this 
risk allocation are the Output Specification and the Payment Mechanism (Rintala, 2004). As the Local 
Authority cannot readily measure the amount of resources the ProjectCo requires producing the 
service, it heavily relies on measuring the output of the service provision and linking the Unitary 
Payment the SPV will receive from the Local Authority for providing the service to that output 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008; Grout and Stevens, 2003). In the case of the building’s energy 
performance, the Local Authority measures the energy consumption of the building, and links the 
Unitary Payment to that performance. Not meeting energy consumption and CO₂ targets exposes the 
ProjectCos to payment deductions as part of performance monitoring linked to the Payment 
Mechanism. Therefore, the ProjectCo is incentivised to avoid penalties for non-compliance and are, 
thus, likely to ensure that the building meets agreed energy performance standards. This study finding 
provides empirical evidence to the importance of risk allocation as a driver for sustainability 
innovation. Indeed, our findings suggest that contract practices that allocate long-term energy 
performance risks to private sector actors may support innovation effort. Innovations for energy 
efficiency are directly linked to the ProjectCo future revenue as a result of the ProjectCo responsibility 
for meeting agreed energy consumption and CO₂ emission targets in the duration of the concession 
period. Energy efficiency also implies future financial savings and returns by reducing the cost of 
building operation. Therefore, sustainable energy innovations are directly linked to the long-term 
profitability of the ProjectCo and are, thus, favourably perceived.  
 
Second, ProjectCo actors on the three innovative projects were inevitably faced with innovation risks 
that needed to be managed. The findings underlined several strategies adopted by ProjectCo actors to 
manage those risks. Technical risks arising from innovation were managed across the multiple case 
studies by improving the technical knowledge base of the team. The experienced design teams of 
21 
BEC (Case Study 1) and HGS (Case Study 2) as well as the appointment of an energy consultant on 
BWS (Case Study 3) provided assurance to the ProjectCo that the developed innovations were well-
resourced. Therefore, the development of sustainable energy innovation in our case studies required 
sufficient technical and sustainability knowledge within the team for the ProjectCo to innovate 
successfully. In addition, the findings highlighted that the innovations implemented were closely 
following best practice. The chimney design in BEC (Case Study 1) was a combination of tried and 
tested technologies. HGS’s (Case Study 3) energy supply strategy was based on a new combination 
of best available technologies. BWS’s (Case Study 4) Biodiesel CHP plant, although new in UK 
school buildings, was a well-known technology and was purchased from an established German 
manufacturer. In all three case studies there was existing evidence to suggest that these technologies 
could be successfully implemented. Reliability of the technology was an important criterion as it 
reduced the uncertainty associated with the innovation and provided further assurance to the 
ProjectCo. Indeed, as our study suggests, the nature of the PFI contract often drives ProjectCo actors 
to adopt tried and tested technologies in order to minimise their risk exposure. Therefore, it can be 
argued that innovation for sustainable energy within PFI projects are more likely to be incremental 
(Lutzenhiser and Biggart, 2003; Slaughter, 1998) and exploitative (Holmqvist, 2004; March, 1991) 
rather than radical (Slaughter, 1998) or explorative (Holmqvist, 2004; March, 1991). However, this 
bias towards incremental innovation may weaken the capacity of PFI contracts to deliver the 
government’s zero-carbon objectives as more radical and system innovations are required to deliver 
such significant reductions in carbon emissions (Enkvist et al., 2008; Huesemen, 2003).  
 
Finally, the findings call attention to the negative effect of excessive perceived capital cost risk on 
the adoption of high-cost technologies with extended payback periods. Across the four case studies, 
the long-term commitment of the ProjectCos to the projects did not justify investment in high-cost 
technologies because payback periods were equally important. Being in a competitive bidding 
process, affordability was also a major consideration. In fact, the biggest challenge for sustainability 
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was seen to be cost and trying to achieve it within the allocated ‘Financial Envelope’. The study 
findings suggest that the need for the ProjectCo to reduce costs to match the approved affordability 
limits established by the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) could result in low levels of sustainability 
innovation on PFI projects. The limitations brought in by perceived capital cost risk is particularly 
damaging to sustainable energy innovation as the nature of the technology requires additional upfront 
cost and design time to develop energy-efficient buildings. Therefore, the limited acknowledgment 
of the need for such initial investment within BSF is potentially detrimental to innovation efforts. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Innovation and risk go hand in hand in complex projects. The purpose of this study was to examine 
the influence of risk allocation on sustainable energy innovation within the context of the PFI project 
delivery model. The study responds to an important gap in knowledge as there has been no attempt 
to explore the relationship between PFI and sustainability innovation, including those for sustainable 
energy. Therefore, the descriptive case studies, and their subsequent analysis and findings should 
prove valuable to both public and private sector actors interested in the delivery of sustainable 
buildings, not only within BSF but for the PFI sector at large. 
 
The study of four new-build BSF PFI school projects provided compelling evidence to the importance 
of greater clarity, appropriateness and manageability of energy-related risks in order to support 
sustainable energy innovation. In fact, the main sustainable energy innovations were largely in order 
to manage long-term energy performance risks allocated to ProjectCo actors and safeguard their long-
term commitment to the project. In addition, the study drew attention to the incremental nature of the 
innovations implemented. Indeed, reliability of the technology was an important criterion and the 
nature of risk allocation in the PFI contract forces private sector actors to adopt tried and tested 
technologies in order to reduce their risk exposure. However, this preference to incremental 
innovation weakens the capacity of PFI contracts to deliver the government’s zero-carbon objectives 
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as more radical and system innovations are needed to meet such significant reductions in carbon 
emissions (Enkvist et al., 2008; Huesemenn, 2003). 
 
The study may have several important implications for policy makers and public authorities 
concerned with the procurement of public sector assets. Importantly, the research study highlights the 
importance of appropriate risk allocation on PFI projects. The allocation of long-term energy 
performance risks to ProjectCo actors was underlined as a successful contractual arrangement in 
providing the ProjectCo with the incentive to improve the energy performance of the project. 
However, risk management should not stop at this point. Demaid and Quintas (2006) emphasized the 
need for formal procedures for risk management to be built into the management processes for major 
projects to allow sustainability issues to be integrated into core procedures, rather than being 
considered as additional, secondary constraints. In the case of PFI projects, efforts to address the 
conflicting requirements placed on the ProjectCo and to reduce the perceived limitations of other 
risks, such as capital cost risk, may work to induce further innovation for sustainable energy.  
 
The study also called attention to the detrimental impact of perceived capital cost risk as a major 
inhibitor for innovation. This accentuate the need for the sustainable energy requirement to be clearly 
reflected in the Public Sector Comparator (PSC). Our findings indicate that many of the conflicts of 
interest among the different parties on PFI project arrangement would be reconciled if there was more 
specific funding channelled toward integrating sustainable energy innovations. Indeed, the method 
by which the PSC is calculated is crucial if sustainable buildings are to be delivered through PFI. For 
example, if the PSC has considered the fact that the scheme must produce 20% of its own energy on 
site from renewable sources; the ProjectCo would have the incentive to include it in their proposals. 
Akintoye et al. (2003) equally emphasise that ‘best value’ in the VfM assessment should take into 
account wider policy objectives. It can thus be argued that delivering the Local Authority’s 
sustainable energy objectives can form an important assessment of ‘best value’ in the PSC’s VfM 
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assessment. Therefore, a vital aspect to obtain more sustainability in PFI would be to build more 
sustainable features into the PSC model. In fact, failing to build sustainable energy into the PSC may 
result in sustainable energy innovations being abandoned as being ‘unaffordable’.  
 
The study has stimulated a number of research questions in need of further investigation. First, the 
examined risks associated with the energy strategy are mostly project-related risks that affect the 
realisation of the project objectives; how these risks may translate into business risks for the risk-
taker, such as uncertainty in profits, threat of loss or business failure, is a research area worthy of 
future exploration. In addition, an important issue in the achievement of sustainable energy that was 
beyond the scope of this research is whether a sustainable school building produces the desired effect, 
i.e. sustainable behaviour in end-use. Future research could build on this study’s findings and further 
explore PFI school projects in their operational stages. An interesting research question would be 
whether the espoused sustainable energy design objectives correlated with experienced sustainable 
energy performance in operation. Future research could also focus on how risk allocation through the 
output specification, payment mechanism and performance-monitoring mechanisms work together 
during the operational stages of PFI projects to ensure that the schools remain energy-efficient during 
operation. 
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Figure 1: Main identified risks associated with the energy strategy 
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Table 1: The case Studies 
Case Study pseudonym Location Value (£) Main SEI(s) Implemented 
1 BEC South West £34m The design utilises an innovative ventilation chimney in every classroom. The 
innovative chimneys provide outstanding cross air flow across the classrooms, 
minimising the need for mechanical ventilation. The school design achieved 40% 
reduction in CO₂ emission against Part L 2002 Building Regulation. 
2 
 
SVC East 
Midlands 
£21.5m No SEI was implemented. 
3 HGS South East £30m The design adopts an innovative sustainable energy supply strategy utilising high-
end technologies (mini-Combined Heat and Power Plant, Ground Source Heat 
Pump, Earth Tubes, and mini-Wind Turbine) to offset and reduce carbon 
emissions and provide micro-generation. This led to a 61% reduction in CO₂ 
emissions against Part L 2002 Building Regulation and 25.3% reduction against 
Part L 2006 Building Regulation. 
4 BWS East 
Midlands 
£20m The design is based on an innovative energy supply solution with an Energy 
Centre housing a biodiesel Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plant, the first to be 
implemented in a school in Britain. The CHP plant provided heating and 
electricity. It also substantially offset the demand for grid energy, leading to a 
dramatic CO₂ reduction of 60% against Part L 2002 Building Regulation. 
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Table 2: Case Study Participants 
 
Team  Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 Case Study 4
Bid Management 
Team 
Bid Manager Bid Manager Assistant Bid Manager 
Whole Life Cost 
Director 
 
Bid Director 
Architect Project Director 
(Principal Architect) 
Project Director 
(Development 
Architect) 
 
Project Director 1 
Project Director 2 
Project Director Project Architect 
M&E Engineer  Project Leader 
Project Engineer 
 
Project Engineer Project Engineer Project Engineer 
Building Contractor Design Manager Operations Manager Operations Manager Operations Manager 
Education Director 
 
Facility Manager General Manager Design Co-ordinator Operations Manager 
 
Contract Manager 
 
Energy Consultant - - - Project Manager  
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Table 3: Qualitative measurement of conceptual constructs 
Concept  Key Construct(s) Measurement  Corresponding Interview Question(s) 
Risk 
allocation 
(1) Clarity of risk 
allocation 
Participant’s perception of 
the extent to which the 
allocation of the risks 
associated with the energy 
strategy is free from 
confusion, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, or doubt. 
 
How clear was the allocation of the risks associated 
with the energy strategy on this project? 
(2) Appropriateness of 
risk allocation 
Participant’s perception of 
the extent to which the 
allocation of the risks 
associated with the energy 
strategy is fitting for a 
particular entity or situation. 
In your opinion, was the allocation of the risks 
associated with the energy strategy appropriate? What, 
if any, risks were non-negotiable? 
 
Were there any specific risks associated with the energy 
strategy that should have been allocated differently? Do 
you think that the affected actors were/are clear over the 
risks that they were taking on? 
 
(3) Manageability of risk 
allocation 
Participant’s perception of 
the extent to which the 
allocation of the risks 
associated with the energy 
strategy can be managed or 
controlled. 
In your opinion was the risk allocated to your 
organisation manageable? 
 
What were the most probable risks to materialise for 
your organisation? How did the innovation influence 
these probabilities? 
 
What were the most probable risks to materialise for the 
project as a whole? How did the innovation influence 
these probabilities? 
 
What were the most significant risks for your 
organisation should they materialise? When were you 
clear that you had to take those risks? How did the 
innovation impact (positive or negative) on the way you 
handled these risks? 
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Table 4: Risk allocation and implication for sustainable energy innovation: summary of 
key findings 
Key Constructs Emergent 
Issues 
Case study 1 
Findings 
Case study 2 
Findings 
Case study 3 
Findings 
Case study 4 
Findings 
Clarity of risk 
allocation 
Clarity of 
Energy-related 
Risks 
Risk allocation clear 
on BSF 
documentation (+) 
 
Building 
Contractor’s limited 
understanding and 
assessment of 
BREEAM risk 
complicated design 
process (-) 
Risk allocation clear 
on BSF 
documentation (+) 
 
Risk allocation clear 
on BSF 
documentation (+) 
 
Appropriateness 
of risk 
allocation 
Appropriateness 
of Energy-
related Risks 
Risk allocation fair 
and acceptable (+) 
 
Conflicting 
requirements and 
excessive perceived 
availability risk 
damaging to energy 
efficiency (-) 
Risk allocation fair 
and acceptable (+) 
 
Risk allocation fair 
and acceptable (+) 
 
Allocation of initial 
carbon target risk to 
Building Contractor 
seen by ProjectCo 
WLC Director to be 
somewhat unfair (-) 
Risk allocation fair 
and acceptable (+) 
 
The 27kg CO₂/m²/yr 
target seen by 
Education Director 
to be onerous and 
difficult to close out 
(-) 
Manageability 
of risk 
allocation 
The 
Management of 
Energy-related 
Risks as a Driver 
for SEI  
Availability risk was 
main driver for 
innovative chimney 
design (+) 
- Energy consumption 
risk, availability risk 
and planning 
approval risk drove 
innovative design (+) 
Operational carbon 
target risk main 
driver for innovative 
CHP solution (+) 
 
Strategies to 
Manage 
Innovation-
related Risks  
 
Perceived technical 
risk managed by 
undertaking 
numerous 
prototyping and 
simulation tests 
 
Chimney design not 
to be ‘too 
experimental’ to 
safeguard investment 
and long-term 
commitment to 
project 
 
Chimney design 
predominantly new 
combination of tried 
and tested 
technologies 
 
- Energy simulation 
models were critical 
to ensure targets are 
met and minimise 
risk 
 
Perceived planning 
approval risk 
managed by 
discussions with 
planners 
 
Innovation is new 
combination of best 
available 
technologies in 
market 
 
Technical risk 
managed by 
appointing an Energy 
Consultant 
 
Bid Director was 
instrumental in 
overcoming 
resistance to 
innovation 
 
Innovation not 
necessarily ‘risk-
taking’ and CHP 
purchased from well-
known manufacturer 
 
Perceived planning 
approval risk 
managed by 
discussions with 
planners 
Unmanageability 
of Innovation-
related Risks as 
Barrier to 
Innovation  
Perceived technical 
risks led to adoption 
of a new 
combination of well-
known technologies 
(-) 
 
Perceived capital 
cost risk inhibited 
adoption of high-cost 
technologies with 
long payback periods 
(-) 
 
Perceived planning 
approval risk 
restricted installation 
of a wind turbine (-) 
Perceived technical 
risks led to adoption 
of safe and robust 
technology (a 
biomass boiler) (-) 
 
Perceived capital 
cost risk inhibited 
adoption of high-
cost technologies (-) 
 
Perceived planning 
approval risk 
restricted adoption 
of a wind turbine (-) 
Perceived capital 
cost risk inhibited  
adoption of high-cost 
technologies with 
long payback periods 
(-) 
 
Perceived off-take 
and construction 
risks associated with 
energy supply 
networks restricted 
their development (-) 
 
 
Perceived capital 
cost risk inhibited 
adoption of high-cost 
technologies with 
long payback periods 
(-) 
 
Note: (+) indicate that the issue has a positive effect on construct, (-) indicate that the issue has negative effect on construct. 
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Table 5: Main identified risks and the party assuming the risk 
 
i In the DCSF (2010) Report ‘Road to Zero-Carbon, Final Report of the Zero-Carbon Task Force’, a ‘zero carbon’ 
building was defined as that with “a net zero carbon emissions over the course of a year [..] after taking into 
account (a) energy consumption and related CO2 emissions of the fixed building services (i.e. heating, ventilation, 
hot water, lighting, and appliances) and (b) energy exports and imports from the development ( and directly 
connected energy installations) to and from centralised energy networks”. However, this definition is yet to be 
finalized, according to the UK Green Building Council Task Group report (2014) titled: ‘Building Zero Carbon – 
the case for action’. 
 
ii BREEAM ‘Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method’ is used in the measurement 
and labelling of a building’s environmental performance. It sets the standards for best practice in building 
design, specification, construction and use. The measures evaluate performance against a wide range of 
environmental and sustainability issues and consequently provide an environmental label for the building in a 
scale of ‘Pass’, ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’, ‘Excellent’ and ‘Outstanding’. In our four case studies, the client 
requirement for Case Study 1, as specified in the output specification, was to achieve BREEAM for Schools’ 
‘Very Good’, while the other three schools were delivered to a requirement of ‘Excellent’ BREEAM rating. 
                                                      
Risk Definition Risk Allocation 
Project-related risks: 
Availability risk 
 
The risk that the building’s environment fails to meet agreed environmental 
criteria and, thus, incurring availability penalties. 
 
ProjectCo SPV 
Energy risk Energy Consumption Risk: the risk that the building’s operational energy 
consumption is beyond agreed standards for maximum annual energy 
consumption in the contract. 
 
ProjectCo SPV/ FM 
 
Energy Tariff Risk: the risk of fluctuations in the market price of energy. ProjectCo SPV/ FM for the 
first three years. 
Subsequently retained by the 
Local Authority 
 
BREEAM target 
risk 
The risk that the building fails to achieve the BREEAM target and, hence, 
incurring penalties. 
 
Building Contractor 
Operational 
carbon target risk 
 
The risk that the building fails to meet the operational carbon target of 27kg 
CO₂/m²/yr and, hence, incurring penalties. 
Building Contractor 
Planning approval 
risk 
The risk that the building specification/energy strategy adopted fails to 
achieve the terms of planning permission. 
 
Building Contractor 
Innovation-related risks: 
Technical risk 
 
The risk that the innovative solution adopted fails to meet technical criteria 
set by the innovating organisation and/or the contract. 
 
The innovating organisation 
Capital cost risk The risk that the innovative solution adopted fails to meet project budget 
and, hence, rejected as being unaffordable. 
 
The innovating organisation 
Schedule risk The risk that the innovative solution adopted fails to be delivered to 
schedule. 
 
The innovating organisation 
